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Abstract
We provide a general framework for characterizing the trade-off between accuracy
and robustness in supervised learning. We propose a method and define quan-
tities to characterize the trade-off between accuracy and robustness for a given
architecture, and provide theoretical insight into the trade-off. Specifically we
introduce a simple trade-off curve, define and study an influence function that
captures the sensitivity, under adversarial attack, of the optima of a given loss
function. We further show how adversarial training regularizes the parameters in
an over-parameterized linear model, recovering the LASSO and ridge regression
as special cases, which also allows us to theoretically analyze the behavior of the
trade-off curve. In experiments, we demonstrate the corresponding trade-off curves
of neural networks and how they vary with respect to factors such as number of
layers, neurons, and across different network structures. Such information provides
a useful guideline to architecture selection.
1 Introduction
Designing effective defense mechanisms against adversarial examples is vital for machine learning
[2, 4, 11, 6, 20]. Most state-of-the-art defense mechanisms are based on choosing suitable parameters
for a given architecture in order to achieve a balance between accuracy and robustness [12, 18]
(we use the word “architecture” to describe a model architecture such as linear regression or a
convolutional neural network). Empirical studies have shown that there may exist an inherent tension
between adversarial robustness and native accuracy [21]. However, we still yet to understand how to
characterize the trade-off between robustness and accuracy for a given architecture and the underlying
theories behind it. Our paper attempts to uncover those theories.
1.1 Characterizing the Trade-off
Why is it important to characterize the inherent trade-off of an architecture? That is because there
are many mysteries unknown: for example, is accuracy always at the cost of robustness? How
is the trade-off related to the number of neurons and layers? Besides, such characterization may
serve as a potential guide for architecture selection. Recent works show that neural networks are
vulnerable to adversarial examples, even though the perturbations to data are imperceptible to human
eyes [3, 8, 13, 14]. Researchers have developed many defense mechanisms [23, 15]. Among them,
several mechanisms involve choosing suitable parameters for a given neural network architecture,
sacrificing a certain degree of accuracy in order to be more robust. For example, instead of choosing
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θ∗ := arg minθ∈Θ EP0 [l(θ, x, y)] (notice that l depends on what architecture being used), where l is
a loss function and P0 is a distribution on the space X × Y , [12] chooses:
θ∗ε,p := arg min
θ∈Θ
EP0 [max
δ∈S
l(θ, x+ δ, y)]
where S is a ε-ball in lp-norm.
In [19], it claims that architecture is a more important factor than size concerning robustness. It is
natural to question: what is the role of architecture with respect to the trade-off between accuracy and
robustness? With different θ’s, the accuracy and robustness differs – promoting the robustness may
decrease the accuracy. However, that trade-off is not so severe under some architectures. [16] shows
some architectures such as variational autoencoder can yield a robust model even using the parameter
chosen by ordinary optimization, which can be very accurate while still be relatively robust. Thus,
a general guideline seems to be very useful – a pre-screening procedure to tell a researcher which
architectures may be more promising to start with.
Thus, we use Trade-off Curve (TOC) to characterize the trade-off of an architecture by looking into
the smallest native loss it can achieve, the smallest adversarial loss it can achieve and the trade-off
between accuracy and robustness along the change of parameters.
1.2 Understanding the Trade-off
We attempt to understand the trade-off separately in two regimes – whether ε is infinitesimal or not.
For infinitesimal ε, we use the influence function, an efficient tool from robust statistics. We adopt
its spirit and develop an influence function of adversarial attack (IFA) in order to capture how the
parameters change as the input data are adversarially perturbed. It can further give us insight about
what factors affect the sensitivity of parameters with respect to adversarial attack. Using the IFA, we
can obtain a closed form approximation to the trade-off quantity we define later.
When ε is not infinitesimal, we illustrate how over-parameterization affects the trade-off. We show
that already in a simple natural data model, over-parameterization can cause the gap between accuracy
and robustness no matter how small the perturbation is. We further explore how adversarial training
imposes regularization to the loss function and how adversarial training is related to classic statistical
model selection. By understanding the adversarial training, it is beneficial to theoretically characterize
the trade-off curve.
1.3 Related Work
There has been some other work on exploring the trade-off between accuracy and robustness, which
bring us great insights. [21] provides the insight that accuracy may be at odds with robustness by
experiments and use a simple example as a proof of concept to analyze theoretically. In [19], the
authors thoroughly benchmark 18 ImageNet models using multiple robustness metrics. They mainly
focus on experimentally studying the trade-off. A closely related work by Zhang et al. [24] identify
a trade-off between robustness and accuracy, but their aim is mainly to use the trade-off to guide
principle in the design of defenses against adversarial examples for a fixed architecture while the
trade-off we identify is mainly for characterizing different architectures.
2 How to Characterize the Trade-off
Consider the supervised learning problem from some input space X (e.g., images) to an output space
Y (e.g.,labels). Let P0 denote the underlying distribution of (x, y) ∈ X × Y . We also assume we are
given a suitable loss function l(θ, x, y;A), for example, the cross-entropy loss for a neural network,
where θ is the parameter, and we specify the architecture A by explicitly writing it out in the loss
function expression.
For fixed θ, we use the expected loss on clean data at θ to quantify accuracy, and use the expected
adversarial loss to quantify robustness. We do not directly use accuracy here since the loss is usually
negative correlated to accuracy, and easier to analyze theoretically. Specifically, we denote
α(θ) := EP0 [l(θ, x, y;A)], β(θ) := EP0 [max
δ∈S
l(θ, x+ δ, y;A)],
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where we adopt the most commonly used formulation of S – an ε ball in lp norm for 1 ≤ p ≤ ∞.
Then, for each θ, we can quantify accuracy and robustness by α(θ) and β(θ) respectively. In order
to characterize the trade-off of an architecture, the ideal way is to examine (α(θ), β(θ)) for every
possible θ, which is impossible to implement. A better way is to examine the Pareto frontier since we
actually only care about those parameters which are not sub-optimal. Here “sub-optimal” means we
can obtain the same performance under adversarial attack while having better performance on clean
data.
Trade-off Curve: We start by choosing the two end points for the trade-off curve. We denote
θ∗ as one of the minimizers of α(θ) that has the lowest value of adversarial loss. Similarly, we
denote θ∗ε as one of the minimizers of β(θ) that has the lowest value of native loss. We build a
Cartesian coordinate system whose horizontal axis represents the expected native loss and vertical
axis represents the expected loss under adversarial attack. Then, we denote the point (α(θ∗), β(θ∗))
as P1 and (α(θ∗ε), β(θ
∗
ε)) as P2. For each θ, its coordinates are (α(θ), β(θ)) and by the nature of θ
∗
and θ∗ε , α(θ) ≥ α(θ∗) and β(θ) ≥ β(θ∗ε) for all θ ∈ Θ. The Pareto frontier is defined as the boundary
where each point (α(θb), β(θb)) lying on it has the property: for any θ ∈ Θ,
if β(θ) = β(θb), then α(θ) ≥ α(θb);
if α(θ) = α(θb), then β(θ) ≥ β(θb),
as figure 1 states. The inherent goodness of an architecture is fully characterized by the efficient
Figure 1: Illustration of The Pareto Frontier
frontier, since this curve is the collection of "good" points. Any point (α(θ), β(θ)) has correspond-
ing points on the frontier which perform no worse than it in both accuracy and robustness. The
methodology above require us to do the following optimization:
min
θ
β(θ), s.t. α(θ) = γ,
for α(θ∗) ≤ γ ≤ α(θ∗ε). In implementation, we sample the points on the curve and then link them.
Thus, we only need solve the following class of optimizations:
min
θ
ξβ(θ) + (1− ξ)α(θ) (1)
for ξ ∈ (0, 1) since it can be proven that for all ξ ∈ (0, 1), the solution to the optimization in (1)
lies on the trade-off curve. However, we should be more careful when dealing with the endpoints,
since (α(θ), β(θ)) obtained by simply optimizing β(θ) and α(θ) may not lie on the frontier. Thus,
we choose to optimize (1) with ξ very close to 0 and 1 to approximate both end points of the trade-off
curve. To sum up, we can simply change ξ and link the obtained points to get an approximation to
our trade-off curve.
In order to further investigate the trade-off of a given architecture theoretically, we take the two
endpoints θ∗ε and θ
∗, and we further identify the trade-off using the following quantity:
∆(A) := EP0 [l(θ∗ε , x, y;A)]− EP0 [l(θ∗, x, y;A)].
The meaning of the above quantity is: if we choose a model under an architecture and make it as
robust as possible, how much worse we will do on clean data compared to the model selected to be as
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accurate as possible. If this quantity is small, we would expect the architecture does not suffer a great
trade-off under adversarial attack.
With smoothness and compactness conditions, we can obtain
∆(A) = EP0 [l(θ∗ε , x, y;A)]− EP0 [l(θ∗, x, y;A)]
=
1
2
(θ∗ε − θ∗)TEP0 [∇2l(θ∗, x, y;A)](θ∗ε − θ∗) + o(‖θ∗ε − θ∗‖2).
Thus, understanding the behavior of θ∗ε − θ∗ is key to understanding the trade-off. Such a characteri-
zation is given in the following section.
3 Theoretical Results to Understand the Trade-off
In this section, we attempt to explore the underlying theory of trade-off under adversarial attack. We
mainly focus on the following two aspects: the sensitivity of minimizer and the role of adversarial
training in the over-parameterized case, which in turn will help us understand the trade-off.
If we have training data set (Xt, Y t) := ({xti}nti=1, {yti}nti=1). We define αˆ, βˆ as follows:
αˆ(θ,Xt, Y t;A) := 1
n
n∑
i=1
l(θ, xti, y
t
i ;A), βˆ(θ,Xt, Y t;A) :=
1
n
n∑
i=1
l(θ, xti + δi, y
t
i ;A),
where ‖δi‖p ≤ ε and {δi}ni=1 are functions of θ that maximizes βˆ(θ,Xt, Y t;A) for a given θ. We
temporally assume αˆ and βˆ both have unique global minimizer (but are not necessarily convex), and
will relax the assumption later in subsection 3.1. The uniqueness assumption can also be formulated
in a more elementary way: for example, if we assume smoothness of loss function α over X ×Θ,
compactness of Θ and we only have one global minimum for α which lies in the interior of Θ, with
positive definite Hessian matrix, and it is well-separated, which means ∀ω > 0, there exists κ > 0,
such that ∀θ , if ‖θ − θ∗‖ > ω, we have
|α(θ,Xt, Y t;A)− α(θ∗, Xt, Y t;A)| > κ,
we can obtain that θˆ is also a global minimum if sample size is large enough. When the attack size ε
is small, we would also have that θˆε is unique. Then, we can denote
θˆ := arg min
θ∈Θ
αˆ(θ,Xt, Y t;A), θˆε := arg min
θ∈Θ
βˆ(θ,Xt, Y t;A).
This gives us the sample version of the trade-off between accuracy and robustness of a given
architecture A:
∆ˆ(A) = 1
2
(θˆε − θˆ)THθˆ(Xe, Y e)(θˆε − θˆ) + o(‖θˆε − θˆ‖22),
where Hθˆ(X
e, Y e) = 1/n
′∑n′
i=1∇2θl(θˆ, xei , yei ;A) denotes the hessian matrix of loss on evaluation
data set (Xe, Y e) := ({xei}n
′
i=1, {yei }n
′
i=1).
3.1 Influence Function of Adversarial Attack
We want to theoretically understand what is the effect on optimal loss function when our input data
are adversarially perturbed a little bit. In order to do that, as we mentioned above, understanding
θˆε− θˆ is the key since we can see from the expression of ∆ˆ(A) , θˆε− θˆ is an important component. In
the spirit of the influence function, we use the following concept,which we call the influence function
of adversarial attack (IFA), to capture the idea of studying models through their training data. Notice
that our concept is different from the one proposed by [1] called adversarial influence function (AIF),
since in their setting the adversary is trying to maliciously interfere with parameter estimation while
in our setting the adversary is trying to interfere with prediction power. For simplicity, we omit the
supscript for X and Y here, and only use X,Y to illustrate our point.
We define
IFA := lim
ε→0
dθˆε
dε
.
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For given X and Y , we can also view 1n
∑n
i=1 l(θ, xi + δi, yi;A) as g(θ, P ), where
P :=

−δT1 −
−δT2 −
...
−δTn−
 .
We can obtain:
Theorem 1. If X , Y and Θ are compact, αˆ is three times continuously differentiable on Θ×X , the
Hessian matrix Hθˆ(X,Y ) is positive definite, and g(·, P ) is differentiable for every P and∇θg(θ, P )
and θˆ lies in the interior of Θ, with non-zero∇xαˆ(θˆ, X, Y ), then we have
IFA = −H−1
θˆ
(X,Y )Φ,
where Φ = 1n
∑n
i=1∇x,θl(θˆ, xi, yi)φi and φi = (ψ1, ψ2, · · · , ψm)T , where
ψk =
bq−1k
(
∑m
k=1 b
q
k)
1
p
sgn(
∂
∂x·,k
l(θˆ, xi, yi)).
Here, we have bk = | ∂∂x·,k l(θˆ, xi, yi)|, x·,k is the k-th coordinate of vector x, for instance, xj =
(xj,1, xj,2, · · · , xj,m)T . d is the dimension of θ and m is the dimension of xk.
This theorem can be used as a theoretical tool to understand how sensitive the optima of loss
function is under adversarial attack and we can use ε·IFA to approximate θˆε − θˆ. Notice that as
long as the unique global minimum θ∗ is well-separated, by continuity, if the sample size is large
enough, the Hessian Hθˆ is positive definite. Besides, the theorem can be extended beyond the case
∇xαˆ(θˆ, X, Y ) 6= 0. In those cases, we need to derive higher order influence function. We leave it to
future work.
Example 1 (Shallow Neural Network). Consider the architecture studied in [5], which has the
following form: f(x,W ) =
∑k
j=1 ajσ(w
T
j x), where aj’s are constant scalars and wj is a vector
with the same dimension of x, both are m. W is the weight matrix whose j-th column is wj . σ is the
quadaratic activation function σ(z) = z2. The loss function is taken as
L(W,X, Y ) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
(yi − f(xi,W ))2 + µ
2
‖W‖2F ,
where ‖ · ‖F is the Frobenius norm and µ > 0. Let us denote Wˆ = arg minW L(W,X, Y ) and
assume∇WL(Wˆ ,X, Y ) = 0,∇2WL(Wˆ ,X, Y )  0. In that case, θ = (wT1 , wT2 , · · · , wTk )T and we
can obtain IFA accordingly:
IFA = (
1
n
n∑
i=1
(yi − f(xi, Wˆ )−∇θf(xi, Wˆ )∇θf(xi, Wˆ )T + µI)−1Φ,
Φ =
1
n
n∑
i=1
(yi − f(xi, Wˆ ))∇xi,θf(xi, Wˆ )φi −∇θf(xi, Wˆ )∇xf(xi, Wˆ )Tφi.
More detailed expression is attached in the supplementary material.
Recall when ε is small, the trade-off we defined yields
∆ˆ(A) ≈ 1
2
(θˆε − θˆ)THθˆ(Xe, Y e)(θˆε − θˆ) ≈
1
2
ΦTH−1
θˆ
(Xt, Y t)Hθˆ(X
e, Y e)H−1
θˆ
(Xt, Y t)Φε2.
where we further by approximate (θˆε − θˆ) by −H−1θˆ (Xt, Y t)Φε. If we denote λemin and λemax
as the minimuml and maximal eigenvalue of Hθˆ(X
e, Y e), λtmin and λ
t
max correspondingly with
respect to Hθˆ(X
t, Y t), and we further assume Hθˆ(X
e, Y e) is positive definite, we have bounds for
ΦTH−1
θˆ
(Xt, Y t)Hθˆ(X
e, Y e)H−1
θˆ
(Xt, Y t)Φ:
λemin
(λtmax)
2
ΦTΦ ≤ ΦTH−1
θˆ
(Xt, Y t)Hθˆ(X
e, Y e)H−1
θˆ
(Xt, Y t)Φ ≤ λ
e
max
(λtmin)
2
ΦTΦ.
As data size increases, we would expect λtmin/λ
e
min and λ
t
max/λ
e
max goes to 1. We can see the
trade-off is closely related to the spectrum of Hessian matrix and Φ and enjoys a quadratic form.
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3.1.1 More General Cases
If by running SGD on αˆ, we obtain θ˜, it is possible that θ˜ is neither a global minimum, nor a unique
global minimum. If we hope to theoretically analyze the sensitivity of the optimal loss function
under adversarial attack at θ˜, we can do as [9] to study a surrogate loss. Specifically, we form
a convex quadratic approximation of the loss around θ˜, i.e., α˜(θ,X, Y ;A) := αˆ(θ˜, X, Y ;A) +
∇θαˆ(θ˜, X, Y ;A)T (θ− θ˜) + 12 (θ− θ˜)T (Hθ˜(X,Y ) +µI)(θ− θ˜). Here µ is a damping term to make
Hθ˜ is positive definite, which corresponds to adding L2 regularization on θ.
To sum up, in subection 3.1, we study the sensitivity of minimizer of loss function under adversarial
attack, where the attack size is infinitesimal. Besides, we assume there are enough data. The cases
of larger attack size and over-parameterization are hard to analyze, thus, we choose to study linear
model to shed some light on adversarial training in subsection 3.2.
3.2 Regularization by Adversarial Training in Over-Parameterized Case
It has been believed the adversarial training helps regularize the model. We dedicate this paragraph to
theoretically illustrate the regularization imposed by adversarial training in over-parametrized linear
model, which can help us character the corresponding trade-off curve. For simplicity, we consider the
over-parametrized linear model, where the data generating process follows Y = Xθ∗, where d > n.
Here
X =

−xT1−
−xT2−
...
−xTn−
 , Y =

y1
y2
...
yn
 .
yi is a scalar, and xi and θ∗ are both vectors of dimension d.
We consider the loss ‖Y −Xθ‖22. In this case, it is easy to see the generalization error can be very
large if we just do the simplest standard training. That is because if we minimize ‖Y t−Xtθ‖22, since
d > n, it is possible that the design matrix Xt has multiple sub-matrices with rank n, so that there
are infinite number of minimizers.
Example 2. Let the design matrix be a Bernoulli matrix, with i.i.d. entries with probability 0.5
equals 1, and 0.5 equals −1. Let d > n. With high probability, there exists infinitely many of
minimizers, and for any B > 0, there exists a minimizer θˆB such that the loss on evaluation data
‖Y e −XeθˆB‖22 > B.
However, if we do adversarial training, it can regularize the model. We firstly study the l∞-bounded
case, where we require ‖δi‖∞ ≤ ε. We denote the set of n×d matrices, in which the infinity norm of
each row is bounded by ε as Ξ. Then, given a data set (X,Y ), the adversarial training can be written
as the following optimization:
min
θ∈Θ
max
P∈Ξ
1
n
‖Y − (X + P )θ‖22. (2)
Theorem 2. Assume Y = Xθ∗, the optimization in (2) is equivalent to the following optimization:
min
θ∈Θ
‖θ‖1, s.t. 1
n
n∑
i=1
(yi − xTi θ)2 ≤ b2,
for some b such that 0 ≤ b ≤ ε‖θ∗‖1, which is equivalent to LASSO: minθ∈Θ 1n
∑n
i=1(yi − xTi θ)2 +
λ‖θ‖1 for some λ.
Under some regularity conditions, LASSO can have really good behavior, which can help us see the
power of adversarial training. Specifically, we assume:
θ∗ has support S ⊂ 1, 2, · · · , p and |S| = s, (s-sparsity) (3)
1
n
‖X∆‖22 ≥ τ‖∆‖22 for all ∆ ∈ Cζ(S), (restricted eigenvalue condition) (4)
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where S is the support of θ∗, Cζ(S) := {∆ ∈ Rp|‖∆Sc‖1 ≤ ζ‖∆S‖1} and ∆S is a vector has
the same entries with ∆ on S and 0 elsewhere. Regularity condition (3) is very commonly seen in
over-parameterized models, which requires the true parameters actually sit on a low-dimensional
manifold. For (4), some commonly seen random matrices can satisfy it with high probabilty. For
example, the random matrix with i.i.d. N (0, 1) entries which satisfies restricted isometry property is
one way to certify the restricted eigenvalue properties with high probability.
Corollary 1. If we further assume (3) and (4) with ζ ≥ 1, if θˆε is a minimizer of (2), we can obtain
‖θˆε − θ∗‖ ≤ b√
τ
b ≤ ε‖θ
∗‖√
τ
. (5)
From (5), we can see, unlike directly minimize ‖Y −Xθ‖22, θˆε has to be close to θ∗. Similarly, the
arguments above can be extended beyond l∞-bounded attack. Let Π be the set of n × d matrices
whose rows are all bounded by  in lp norm. The adversarial training is to optimize:
min
θ∈Θ
max
P∈Π
1
n
‖Y − (X + P )θ‖22, (6)
and we can transform the optimization in (6) to
min
θ∈Θ
‖θ‖q, s.t. 1
n
n∑
i=1
(yi − xTi θ)2 ≤ b2,
for some b such that 0 ≤ b ≤ ε‖θ∗‖q, where 1p + 1q = 1. When q = 2, it is equivalent to a ridge
regression.
In this section, we can see how adversarial training can be related to classic method in statistics. It
is worth exploring in the future the underlying theory about regularization imposed by adversarial
training. We end up this subsection by giving the following characterization of the trade-off curve:
Theorem 3. Under lp-bounded attack with size ε, if Y = Xθ∗
min
θ
ξβˆ(θ,X, Y ;A) + (1− ξ)αˆ(θ,X, Y ;A) (7)
can be transformed into
min
θ∈Θ
‖θ‖q, s.t. 1
n
n∑
i=1
(yi − xTi θ)2 ≤ b2,
for some b such that 0 ≤ b ≤ ε√ξ‖θ∗‖q. In the case p =∞, if we further assume (3) and (4) with
ζ ≥ 1, if θˆξ is a minimizer of the sample version of optimization (1), we can obtain
‖θˆξ − θ∗‖ ≤ ξε‖θ
∗‖√
τ
. (8)
4 Numerical Experiments
We study the trade-off curves varying the following neural network parameters: the number of layers
(depth), the number of filters (width) and neural network architectures (simple convolutional, VGG
[17] and ResNet-50 [7]); and the following attack parameters: size of the attack and attacks norms
(l2 and l∞). We use VGG-16 with 64 filters in the first layer as the default architecture. We use
0.3 as the default attack size for l2 attacks and 0.015 for l∞ attacks. We do all our experiments on
CIFAR-10, which has 60000 images of 32 × 32 × 3 [10], and we normalize the input images to
[0, 1] in all experiments. We study two trade-off curves: one for test set loss and the other for test set
accuracy. We set ξ to be [0.001, 0.25, 0.50, 0.75, 0.999]. As explained in section 2, we use 0.001 and
0.999 instead of 0 and 1 for end points.
Figures 2 and 3 show all testing results. In Figure 2, we fix the neural network architecture to be
VGG-16 and change other parameters. Overall, we observe that there indeed exists an inherent
tension between robustness and accuracy. Besides, we found that as we increase the capacity of
networks (e.g. larger depth or width), we achieve higher accuracy in both adversarial examples and
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Figure 2: (A) VGG-16 with different width under l2 attack (B) VGG with different depth under l2
attack. We use the original VGG-16 and VGG-19 architectures in [17] and cut the VGG-16 at the 4th
conv layer and combine with a fully connected layer to obtain VGG-5 (C) VGG-16 under l2 and l∞
attack (D) VGG-16 with different attack size under l2 attack.
legitimate ones, but the adversarial accuracy we need to sacrifice for increasing native loss is also
increasing. As we increase the attack size, the adversarial accuracy we need to sacrifice for native
accuracy is increasing. In addition, we found that comparing with l2 attacks, the trade-off under l∞
is more severe between adversarial accuracy and native accuracy.
Figure 3(E) shows the results cross different types of networks and 3(F) shows the results for the
simple convolutional architecture with different width under l∞ attack. As we can see, the best
adversarial accuracy using VGG-16 is almost the same as ResNet-50 even though the capacity is very
different, which confirms the observation by Su et al. [19] that network type is a more important
factor than size with respect to robustness.
0.86 0.88
native accuracy
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
ad
ve
rs
ar
ia
l a
cc
ur
ac
y
(E)
Vgg-16
resnet50
0.80 0.85 0.90
native loss
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
ad
ve
rs
ar
ia
l l
os
s
Vgg-16
resnet50
0.75 0.80 0.85 0.90
native accuracy
0.4
0.6
ad
ve
rs
ar
ia
l a
cc
ur
ac
y
(F)
16.0
32.0
64.0
128.0
0.8 1.0
native loss
2
3
ad
ve
rs
ar
ia
l l
os
s
16.0
32.0
64.0
128.0
Figure 3: (E) comparison between different types of networks (VGG-16 and ResNet-50) under l2
attack (F) simple convolutional neural network with different width under l∞ attack.
5 Conclusion
We identify a trade-off between accuracy and robustness and explore the underlying theory behind it.
Specifically, we derive a theoretical tool to understand how optimal loss function changes when the
input data are adversarially perturbed. Besides, we show how adversarial learning helps regularize
the linear model. We also empirically visualize the trade-off and relate it to previous works.
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Supplementary Material
Proof of Theorem 1
In order to prove theorem 1, let us first state the Danskin theorem.
Lemma 1 (Danskin). Let B be nonempty compact topological space and h : Rd × B → R be
such that h(·, δ) is differentiable for every δ ∈ B and∇θh(θ, δ) is continuous on Rd × B. Also, let
δ∗(θ) = {δ ∈ arg maxδ∈B h(θ, δ)}.
Then, the corresponding max-function
ξ(θ) = max
δ∈B
h(θ, δ)
is locally Lipschitz continuous, directionally differentiable, and its directional derivatives satisfy
ξ
′
(θ, r) = sup
δ∈δ∗(θ)
rT∇θh(θ, δ).
In particular, if for some θ ∈ Rd the set δ∗(θ) = {δ∗θ} is a singleton, the max-function is differentiable
at θ and
∇ξ(θ) = ∇θh(θ, δ∗θ ).
By this lemma, we can easily obtain the following lemma:
Lemma 2. For any θ˜ that minimize ξ(θ) and lying in the interior, we can obtain
∇θh(θ˜, δ) = 0.
Proof. Since θ˜ minimizes ξ(θ) and lies in the interior of Θ , we can obtain
ξ
′
(θ˜, r) = 0
for any direction vector r.
If there is a δ ∈ δ∗(θ˜), such that ∇θh(θ˜, δ) 6= 0, then we take r = ∇θh(θ˜, δ)/‖∇θh(θ˜, δ)‖, we have
ξ
′
(θ˜, r) = sup
δ∈δ∗(θ˜)
rT∇θh(θ˜, δ) ≥ ‖∇θh(θ˜, δ)‖2 > 0,
which is contradictory to the fact∇θh(θ˜, δ) = 0.
Now we are ready to give the formal proof. In order for simplicity, we here use l(θ, x, y) instead of
l(θ, x, y;A). With lemma 2, we can obtain that
1
n
n∑
i=1
∇θl(θ, xi + δi, yi)|θ=θˆε = 0.
With Taylor expansion and under the assumption of theorem 2, we can obtain
0 =
1
n
n∑
i=1
[∇θl(θˆε, xi, yi) +∇x,θl(θˆε, xi, yi)δi +O(‖δ‖22)].
Here the assumption of compactness and continuity can help us to write the remainder 12δ
T
i Hθ˜δi into
O(‖δ‖22) since we can bound every entry of Hθ˜. We use the same property again and again and we
will not reiterate it.
Now, let us perform taylor expansion on∇θl(θˆε, xi, yi) and ∇x,θl(θˆε, xi, yi).
∇θl(θˆε, xi, yi) = ∇θl(θˆ, xi, yi) +∇2θl(θˆ, xi, yi)(θˆε − θˆ)
+O(‖θˆε − θˆ‖22)
and
∇x,θl(θˆε, xi, yi) = ∇x,θl(θˆ, xi, yi) +O(‖θˆε − θˆ‖2).
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Thus, by simple algebra manipulation
θˆε − θˆ +O(‖θˆε − θˆ‖22) =
(− 1
n
n∑
i=1
∇2θl(θˆ, xi, yi)
)−1( 1
n
n∑
i=1
∇x,θl(θˆ, xi, yi)δi
+ ‖θˆε − θˆ‖2‖δi‖2)
)
.
We know if we divided ε on both sides, we know when ε goes to 0, the limit of the right handside
exists if we assume the limit of limε→0 δi/ε exist. Thus, ‖θˆε − θˆ‖/ε cannot goes to infinity as ε goes
to 0. In orther words, IFA must exist!
Notice that δi here actually should be δε,i, which will converge to the δi ∈ S maximizing
∇xl(θˆ, xi, yi) · δi.
By Ho¨lder inequality,
δi,k =
bq−1k
(
∑m
k=1 b
q
k)
1
p
sgn(
∂
∂x·,k
l(θˆ, xi, yi))ε,
where bk = | ∂∂x·,k l(θˆ, xi, yi)|. Thus, our whole arguments stand including the existence of limit.
Thus, as ε→ 0, we can obtain that
dθˆε
dε
=
(− 1
n
n∑
i=1
∇2θl(θˆ, xi, yi)
)−1
Φ
where Φ = 1n
∑n
i=1∇x,θl(θˆ, xi, yi)φi and φi = (ψ1, ψ2, · · · , ψm)T , where ψk = b
q−1
k
(
∑m
k=1 b
q
k)
1
p
.
Proof of Theroem 2
The proof of theorem 3 is almost the same, using Ho¨lder inequality. Let us focus on calculating
maxP∈Ξ 1n‖Y − (X + P )θ‖22.
1
n
‖Y − (X + P )θ‖22 =
1
n
(‖Y −Xθ‖22 − 2(Y −Xθ)TPθ + ‖Pθ‖22)
Since Pθ = (
∑p
i=1 p1jθj ,
∑p
i=1 p2jθj , · · · ,
∑p
i=1 pnjθj)
T . By choosing pij = sgn(θj)sgn(xTi θ−
yi)ε, we can obtain the maximum of 1n‖Y − (X + P )θ‖22 = 1n
∑n
i=1(|yi − xTi θ|+ ε‖θ‖1)2. Thus,
the optimization problem in (2) can be rewritten as
min
θ∈Θ
1
n
n∑
i=1
(|yi − xTi θ|+ ε‖θ‖1)2.
If θˆε is a minimizer of the above optimization. Since we know that plugging in θ∗, we can obtain the
loss being ε2‖θ∗‖21, thus, θˆε satisfies
1
n
n∑
i=1
(|yi − xTi θˆε|+ ε‖θε‖1)2 ≤ ε2‖θ∗‖21.
Actually, it is easy to see θˆε is also the solution of the following oracle optimization problem:
min
θ∈Θ
‖θ‖1, s.t. 1
n
n∑
i=1
(yi − xTi θ)2 ≤
1
n
n∑
i=1
(yi − xTi θˆε)2.
Thus, we can obtain that θˆε is the solution to the following optimization:
min
θ∈Θ
‖θ‖1, s.t. 1
n
n∑
i=1
(yi − xTi θ)2 ≤ b2,
for some 0 ≤ b ≤ ε‖θ∗‖1, which is equivalent to LASSO: minθ∈Θ 1n
∑n
i=1(yi − xTi θ)2 + λ‖θ‖1 for
some λ.
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Proof of Corollary 1
Since θ∗ is a feasible solution, we know ‖θˆε‖1 ≤ ‖θ∗‖1 we can obtain by theorem 7.1 in [22] that
θˆε − θ∗ ∈ C1(S) ⊂ Cζ(S).
Thus, we can obtain by regularity condition (4) that
τ‖θˆε − θ∗‖22 ≤ b2 ≤ ε2‖θ∗‖22. (9)
Calculation of Example 1
∇θf(x,W ) =
(
2a1w
T
1 xx
T , · · · , 2akwTk xxT
)T
,
∇xf(x,W ) =
k∑
j=1
2ajw
T
j xwj .
We can obtain
∇2θf(x,W ) =
(
2a1w
T
1 xx
Tw1, · · · , 2akwTk xxTwk
)T
,
∇x,θf(x,W ) =
B1...
Bk

where
Bj =

2ajx·,1(wj + e1)T
2ajx·,2(wj + e2)T
...
2ajx·,m(wj + em)T
 .
Here ej = (0, 0, · · · , 1, 0, · · · , 0)T is the vector with only the j-th entry is 1, other entries are 0.
∇x,θl(θ, x, y) = 2(y − f(x,W ))∇x,θf(x,W )− 2∇θf(x,W )∇xf(x,W )T
∇xl(θ, x, y) = 2(y − f(x,W ))∇xf(x,W ),
ψk =
|y−f(x,W )|q−1| ∂f(x,W )∂x·k |
q−1∑m
k=1 |y−f(x,W )|q−1| ∂f(x,W )∂x·k |
q−1 sgn
(
(y − f(x,W ))∂f(x,W )∂x·k
)
.
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